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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Canadian and Australian courts have held the above arguments to be
sufficient basis for recognition of per quod servitium amisit without the
Hambrook limitation. A recent Canadian case, not involving a menial or
domestic servant, added an interesting modification to the interpretation
of "loss of services." Reasoning that loss of profits to an employer due to
injury to his servant is unforeseeable to the negligent defendant, the court
in Genereux v. Peterson, Howell & Heather (Canada) Ltd.,26 refused to allow
damages for loss of profits and limited the defendant's liability to payment
to the employer of the amount spent in acquiring substitute services. This
limitation is one that the Missouri court and other American jurisdictions
rejecting per quod would do well to consider. It allows recovery by an
employer who has been out the expense of obtaining substitute help with-
out placing undue burdens on negligent defendants. This Canadian gloss
might present a suitable compromise for courts that feel the action is
outmoded. In analyzing this limitation, however, one should consider
whether it provides adequate compensation to the master of a "unique" or
"key" employee.
An analysis of the Missouri court's opinion in Horton shows a decision
which is in keeping with a general trend in American courts. However, a
closer examination of the action per quod, its history, and the reasons for
which it is still recognized in other jurisdictions tends to make one wonder
if the court was hasty in permanently razing a cause of action which allows
one economically damaged to recover from one responsible for the injury
causing the loss. This question becomes one of prime importance where a
damaged master finds himself remediless for the loss of services of a key
employee.
BOBETrE SANDERS
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE-LIMITATION OF
ACTIONS-PERIOD WITHIN WHICH
BENEFICIARY MUST SUE STILL
STRICTLY CONSTRUED
State ex rel. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. v. Clark'
Roy Ruis died on June 12, 1970, from injuries he received while
employed by Kansas City Stock Yards Company. He was survived by his
wife, three minor children, and his parents. Shortly after Ruis' death, his
widow and minor children filed a claim against Stock Yards under the
935; Fridman, Loss of Services, 24 SOLICITOR 10 (1957); Note, Commissioner for
Railways (N.S.W.) v. Scott, 2 MEL. U.L. REV. 413 (1960).
26. [1973] 34 D.L.R.3d 614.
1. 536 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
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Kansas Workmen's Compensation Law.2 That claim was denied on August
9, 1971. Plaintiffs then filed a wrongful death claim in the Jackson County
Circuit Court on May 25, 1972. Upon Stock Yard's application for a writ of
prohibition, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that the wrongful death
claim of the widow and minor children was barred when brought more
than one year, but less than two years, after decedent's death because he
was survived by his parents. 3 Furthermore, the period of limitations was
not tolled by the pendency of plaintiffs' Workmen's Compensation claim.4
In Selsor v. Zenith Radio Corp.,5 decided concurrently with Stock Yards, the
essential facts were similar. The court again denied the decedent's widow
and minor child the right to maintain a wrongful death claim more than
one year after death when decedent's parents also survived.
The practice of paying compensation to the relatives of a person killed
through the negligence of another is rooted in Anglo-Saxon history.6 But
the development of a common law wrongful death claim was curtailed by
the case of Baker v. Bolton7 in which Lord Ellenborough ruled that there
was no cause of action at common law for the death of a person.8 The
subsequent adoption of this rule by both English and American courts
created a void in the common law. The English were the first to remedy the
situation by enacting Lord Campbell's Act in 1846. 9 American legislatures
2. The claim, filed on November 30, 1970, was denied not on its merits, but
on the ground that Stock Yards had not elected to be covered by Workmen's
Compensation and was not engaged in one of the hazardous occupations for which
such coverage was mandatory. A denial of the claim on June 8, 1971, was appealed.
By the time this decision was affirmed on August 12, 1971, it was already more than
one year since Ruis' death. Id. at 146, 149-50.
3. The Missouri wrongful death act contains two periods of limitation. The
general limitation, § 537.100, RSMo 1969, states that "[e]very action instituted
under section 537.080 shall be commenced within two years after the cause of
action shall accrue ..... But § 537.080, RSMo 1969 provides that an action may
be brought:
(1) By the spouse or minor children. . . or
(2) If there be no spouse or minor children or if the spouse or minor children
fail to sue within one year after such death. . . then by the father and mother
... . (emphasis added).
4. Plaintiffs sought to make applicable to their petition a provision which tolls
the limitation for wrongful death claims for one year after a nonsuit is suffered. §
537.100, RSMo 1969. The court rejected this argument on the ground that the
Workmen's Compensation Claim was not an "action" within the meaning of §
537.100, RSMo 1969. 536 S.W.2d at 146. See also King v. Smith Baking Co., 228
Mo. App. 721, 71 S.W.2d 115 (K.C. Ct. App. 1934).
5. 536 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
6. See generally I S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1:2 (2d ed.
1975) [hereinafter referred to as SPEISER].
7. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
8. It has been noted that Baker v. Bolton was tried in a local court before a
single judge, and there was neither supporting authority nor clear reasoning given
for the rule of law. Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13
VAND. L. REV. 605, 614-15 (1960).
9. An Act for Compensating the Families of Persons Killed by Accidents,
1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
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soon followed this example by passing wrongful death statutes.' 0 Missouri's
first wrongful death act, adopted in 1855, was patterned after Lord Camp-
bell's Act.'"
Because of the adoption of the rule that there was no cause of action
for wrongful death at common law, wrongful death statutes are often
construed strictly as in derogation of the common law. 12 This strict con-
structionist attitude often frustrates the compensatory purpose of the stat-
ute by causing a denial of benefits to the persons the statutes were designed
to protect. Plaintiffs have special difficulties pursuing wrongful death
claims in Missouri because of the complexity of the statute and the multipl-
icity of rules which have been developed to aid in its interpretation. 3 The
remainder of this casenote will critically examine the case authority under-
lying the Stock Yards court's pronouncement of ten "uniformly followed
principles"' 4 of interpretation of the wrongful death statute and will
identify areas of interpretation of the wrongful death statute in which the
strict constructionist attitude has been replaced by a more liberal one.
These are the areas in which plaintiffs are most likely to persuade Missouri
courts to change the wrongful death laws.
The first principle set out in Stock Yards stated that the wrongful death
statute provides but one indivisible claim for the death of a person which
accrues on the date of death.' 5 This principle has two parts: the first deals
with the indivisibility of wrongful death claims, and the second with the
accrual of the cause of action. According to the "indivisibility principle,"
there is only a single right of action, no matter how many parties are guilty
10. New York's law was first in the United States. An Act Requiring Compen-
sation for Causing Death by Wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default, ch. 450, 1847 N.Y.
Laws, p. 575.
11. An Act for the Better Security of Life, Property and Character, ch. 51, §§
1-8, RSMo 1855. The statute contained two sections under which claims for wrong-
ful death could be brought, one providing a penalty for deaths caused by common
carriers, ch. 51, § 2, RSMO 1855 (repealed 1955), and the other for all other cases of
deaths caused by wrongful acts, ch. 51, § 3, RSMo 1855.
12. For a list of jurisdictions so holding (including Missouri) see 1 SPEISER,
supra note 6, § 1:12.
13. The Missouri death statute gives the wrongful death cause of action first to
the surviving spouse and minor children, then if they are not living or fail to sue
within a year, to the father and mother. If no one in this first or second class of
beneficiaries exists, then the personal representative may bring an action for the
benefit of heirs. § 537.080, RSMO 1969. There are also two time limitations in the
statute (note 3, supra) and innumerable problems of interpretation. The Missouri
statute is somewhat unusual in this respect. Most American death acts follow Lord
Campbell's Act and give the right to bring the action to the deceased's personal
representative immediately, thereby avoiding many of the problems of sequential
timing of claims faced under the Missouri statute. See 2 SPEISER, supra note 6, §
11:29 for a list of all states showing who is entitled to bring the action in each.
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of causing a wrongful death. An attempt by a beneficiary to enforce a claim
against anyone is an appropriation of the entire wrongful death claim. 6 In
Spencer v. Bradley17 a surviving spouse released some of the tortfeasors
responsible for his wife's death while expressly reserving the right to sue
the others. He did not file a claim during the limitations period applicable
to spouses. His children then brought a wrongful death action against the
unreleased tortfeasors. Their claim was denied because the husband's
release of some tortfeasors had appropriated the entire wrongful death
claim, barring the childrens' rights even as to unreleased tortfeasors. The
wrongful death cause of action cannot be split between classes of ben-
eficiaries. This principle is applied uniformly,'8 and at times defeats the
compensatory purpose of the statute.19
The "accrual principle" establishes that the cause of action accrues at
death. This principle is uniformly applied in Missouri.2 In Frazee v. Part-
ney2' plaintiff's wife was the victim of a hit and run driver. By the time
plaintiff discovered the identity of the driver, the statute of limitations had
run. His argument that the cause of action did not accrue until he found
the defendant was rejected. The unfairness which can result from applica-
tion of the "accrual principal" is mitigated by allowing certain situations to
toll the statute of limitations. For example, if a defendant absents himself
from the state so that personal service cannot be had on him, the time
period during which he is absent does not count as part of the two year
limitation period.2 2 Also, if in a timely filed action plaintiff suffers a
nonsuit, or judgment is arrested or reversed, the plaintiff can bring a new
16. Packard v. Hannibal & St. J.R.R., 181 Mo. 421, 80 S.W. 951 (1904).
17. 351 S.W.2d 202 (Mo. 1961).
18. Blessing v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 357 Mo. 1006, 171 S.W.2d 602 (1943);
McNamara v. Slavens, 76 Mo. 329 (1882).
19. Courts should allow a second claim to be filed in cases where plaintiff has
sued the wrong defendant and does not discover the mistake until the statute of
limitations has run. In Packard v. Hannibal & St. J.R.R., 181 Mo. 421, 80 S.W. 951
(1904) a widow had sued the wrong railroad for her husband's death. The defen-
dant's motion to dismiss was granted after the widow's time for bringing an action
was barred by the statute of limitations. As there was at the time no provision for
tolling the statute in cases of nonsuit, she could not refile the claim. It was decided
that her children could not then sue the proper defendant, although their claim was
not yet barred by the statute of limitations, since the claim filed by the widow had
appropriated the "one single indivisible cause of action" and forever cut off the
rights of her children. Not allowing a second claim to be filed because of the
"indivisibility principle" does serious injustice to the decedent's beneficiaries in
cases such as this.
20. Kennedy v. Burrier, 36 Mo. 128 (1865); Deming v. Williams, 321 S.W.2d
720 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959).
21. 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958).
22. § 537.100, RSMo 1969. A non-resident motorist would not come under
this section, since personal service can be had upon him through the long arm
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action within one year.23 The general statutes of limitations are tolled
during any time in which defendant's improper act prevents plaintiff from
commencing an action.24 Plaintiff in Frazee was not allowed the benefit of
this tolling provision, because provisions which toll the general statutes of
limitations are not applicable to the wrongful death "special statute of
limitations." 25 Frazee serves as a warning that courts construe the wrongful
death statute strictly in deciding what will toll the statute of limitations.
Another principle relied on by the Stock Yards court requires the suit
for wrongful death to be filed within two years from the date of death
unless a tolling situation exists.2 6 Under this "general limitation principle"
Missouri courts have adopted a liberal policy toward permitting amend-
ments made after the statute of limitations has run to relate back to the
original petition. Many cases state the requirement that a claimant for
wrongful death must bring himself strictly within the terms of the statute to
state a claim.2 7 Thus one would expect that a defective petition which failed
to state a claim under the express terms of the statute could not be cured by
allowing an amendment to relate back after the statute of limitations had
run. However, such relation back has been allowed frequently.28 Although
Missouri had no rule of procedure on the relation back of amendments
prior to 1973, it had been established by Slater v. Kansas City Terminal
Railway Co29 that a petition which contained the essential elements of a
23. § 537.100, RSMo 1969.
24. § 516.280, RSMo 1969.
25. The period of limitations for wrongful death claims is tolled only by the
two provisions specifically included in the wrongful death act. See text accompany-
ing notes 22, 23 supra. See also Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958),
criticized in Rahoy, Torts- Wrongful Death Statute in Missouri-Application of General
Statutes of Limitation, 24 Mo. L. REV. 397 (1959). The statutes of limitations applica-
ble to torts generally may be tolled: when service cannot be had on defendant
because of his absence from the state (§ 516.200, RSMo 1969); when the plaintiff is
under a disability such as minority, insanity, etc. (§ 516.170, RSMo 1969); when a
plaintiff suffers a nonsuit, or reversal or arrest of judgment in a related judicial
proceeding (§ 516.260, RSMo 1969); when defendant's improper acts keep plain-
tiff from suing (§ 516.280, RSMo 1969); when a party entitled to sue but under a
disability dies (§ 516.170, RSMo 1969); when a plaintiff or primary defendant dies
(§§ 516.180, .240, .250, RSMo 1969). If the wrongful death period of limitations
were construed as other statutes of limitations, all these provisions would be avail-
able for wrongful death plaintiffs. For a study of the structure of statutes of
limitation in Missouri, see Davis, Tort Liability and the Statutes of Limitation, 33 Mo.
L. REV. 171 (1968).
26. 536 S.W.2d at 145.
27. Chandler v. Chicago & A.R.R., 251 Mo. 592, 600-01, 158 S.W. 35, 37
(1913); Barker v. Hannibal & St. J. Ry., 91 Mo. 86, 94, 14 S.W. 280, 282 (1886).
28. Nelms v. Bright, 299 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. En Banc 1957); Slater v. K.C.
Terminal Ry., 271 S.W.2d 581 (Mo. 1954); Cytron v. St. Louis Transit Co., 205 Mo.
692, 104 S.W. 109 (En Banc 1907).
29. 271 S.W.2d 581 (Mo. 1954). A widow filed as administratrix of her
husband's estate under FELA, but the suit could not be maintained because defen-
dant was not her husband's employer. After the statute of limitations had run on
[Vol. 42
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claim but was defective for failure to allege some necessary fact could be
amended to cure the deficiency after the statute of limitations had run.
New defendants could not be added after the statute of limitations had
run,30 but could be added after the expiration of the six months preferen-
tial period by a beneficiary of the first class who had appropriated the
wrongful death claim within this shorter period."'
The courts' approach to relation back of amendments should become
even more liberal because of the adoption of Missouri Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 55.33(c). Under this rule an amendment relates back to the date of
the original pleading whenever the claim or defense in the amended
pleading "arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading . .. "32 The new
Missouri rule is identical to the first paragraph of rule 15(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. If Missouri courts follow the construction given
federal rule 15(c) by the federal courts, an amendment will be allowed to
relate back if the original claim was adequate to notify the defendant of the
facts upon which relief is sought." Thus, addition of both defendants and
plaintiffs may be possible after the statute of limitations has run.34 The new
rule should permit courts to avoid some of the harsh results reached in
earlier cases, but it is not yet clear how liberal Missouri courts will become
in allowing relation back of amendments under the new rule.
35
her claim, she was permitted to file an amended claim as widow under the wrongful
death act.
30. Deming v. Williams, 321 S.W.2d 720 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959).
31. Meyer v. Pevely Dairy Co., 333 Mo. 1109, 64 S.W.2d 696 (1933).
32. MO. R. CIv. P. 55.33(c).
33. The federal courts have used a "notice" test in determining when amend-
ed claims arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth in the
original pleading. The policy behind this test is that if the original pleading notified
defendant of the facts on which plaintiff's claim is based, defendant can then
prepare a defense to any claims arising out of the same factual situation. The
construction given a federal rule is persuasive authority for Missouri courts in
construing Missouri rules which are identical to the analogous federal rule. See
Crahan, Expansion of Permissive Joinder of Defendants in Missouri, 41Mo. L. REV. 199
(1976).
34. Addition of defendants should be permitted where the original pleadings
notify defendants of the facts on which relief is sought, and there is such identity of
interest between original and substitute defendants that defendant should know
that but for a mistake he would be the one sued. If the original pleadings are
adequate to notify defendant that other persons are entitled to sue him on the
wrongful death claim, it should be possible to add these other persons by amend-
ment after the statute of limitations has run. If necessary, a plaintiff should be able
to amend the capacity in which he sues after the statute has run. See Marlow,
Amendments to Pleadings After the Statute of Limitations Has Run-A Change in Mis-
souri, 40 MO. L. REV. 489 (1975).
35. One case dealing with relation back of amended pleadings in a wrongful
death case has been decided since the new rule became effective. In State ex rel.
Jewish Hospital v. Buder, 540 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976) a petition
changing the capacity in which plaintiff sued from adult child to administratrix was
not permitted to relate back. The court cited the new rule on relation back of
1977]
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The remaining principles cited by the court deal with the existence of
two periods of limitation in the wrongful death statute. Beneficiaries some-
times have less than the full statutory period of limitations in which to bring
a suit. According to the "long limitation period principle" if there is no
father or mother, the spouse and minor children have the full two years in
which to sue. Likewise, if there is no spouse or minor child, the father and
mother may sue at any time within the two year period.36 The courts have
allowed such suits anytime within the two year period if there exists only
one class of beneficiaries entitled to the wrongful death claim.37 This
"longer limitation period principle" was recently applied in Almcrantz v.
Carney38 and Montemayor v. Harvey. 3 9 In those cases a surviving spouse was
permitted to sue anytime within the two year limitation period where there
were no parents living. Judge Bardgett filed concurring opinions in
Almcrantz and Montemayor. He would have allowed suit by the surviving
spouse anytime within two years after death even if deceased's parents had
also survived based upon the reasoning that "[t]he period of limitations is
not shortened, as far as the tortfeasor is concerned, by the existence of
more than one class of persons .... -40 This reasoning has been used to
enable a surviving spouse who appropriates the cause of action within the
shorter limitation period to then bring an action anytime within the longer
limitation period, despite the existence of other classes of beneficiaries. 1
As noted by the dissent in Stock Yards, the application of this portion of the
"longer limitation period principle" to Stock Yards would require a differ-
ent result.4 2 Nowhere in the wrongful death act does it specifically state that
amendments, and then merely stated that it does not authorize an amendment to
state an entirely new claim. Since the court did not even consider whether the
original pleading was sufficient to notify the defendant of the facts on which the
claim against him was based, it did not give the new rule fair treatment, and the case
is of questionable value as a precedent. It would have been fair to defendant to
allow this amendment to relate back if the petition had informed him of adequate
facts on which to prepare a defense. Had the court followed the "notice" test used
by federal courts, the amendment would have related back. See Crowder v. Gordon
Transports, Inc., 387 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967), in which an amendment changing
the capacity in which a widow sued from that of administratrix to that of next friend
of her two minor children was allowed to relate back to the original petition.
36. 536 S.W.2d at 145.
37. Aley v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 211 Mo. 460, 111 S.W. 102 (1908); Barker v.
Hannibal & St. J. Ry., 91 Mo. 86, 14 S.W. 280 (1886).
38. 490 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1973).
39. 490 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1973).
40. Almcrantz v. Carney, 490 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Mo. 1973).
41. See, e.g., Huss v. Bohrer, 317 Mo. 204, 295 S.W. 95 (1927). Suit under the
existing wrongful death statute could be brought first by the surviving spouse, then
if he or she failed to sue within six months, by the minor children. § 4217, RSMo
1919. All actions for wrongful death had to be brought within one year from death.
§ 4221, RSMo 1919. In this case the widow filed and dismissed a suit within six
months. She was permitted to file a new suit eight months after death, even though
there were minor children.
42. If this reasoning had been applied in Stock Yards, the widow and children
(Vol. 42
7
Doesburg: Doesburg: Wrongful Death Statute-Limitation of Actions
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
RECENT CASES
a single surviving class of beneficiaries, or a class which has appropriated
the cause of action within the first year, shall have the full two years in
which to sue; thus this principle embodies a liberal reading of the statute by
the courts. Its uniform application advances the goal of compensating
relatives of the deceased by affording them adequate time to prepare suit.
According to another principle dealing with the sequential timing of
beneficiaries' claims, the wrongful death claim passes to another class of
beneficiaries if not enforced by one class during the specified period.
4 3
There has been no uniform interpretation of what constitutes sufficient
"appropriation" of a claim to entitle a preferred class of beneficiaries to the
full two year limitations period in which to sue. According to early cases,
beneficiaries could appropriate a claim only by instituting a suit.4 4 Later
cases have ruled that a plaintiff may appropriate the entire cause of action
by settling with the tortfeasors without first bringing a suit.4 5 Recently a
surviving spouse was allowed to appropriate the claim against all tort-
feasors merely by executing a full release of some but not all of them.
46
The historical trend under this "appropriation principle" is to allow a
wider variety of acts by beneficiaries to constitute an appropriation of the
wrongful death cause of action. It should have been argued in Stock Yards
that the filing of the Workmen's Compensation claim was an appropriation
of the wrongful death claim by the widow and children. This would have
vested the cause of action exclusively in them, giving them the full two
years in which to file their wrongful death claim. Such an argument might
have succeeded because of the liberal construction in this area, and the
absence of contrary authority.
47
The problem in both Stock Yards and Selsor focused upon determining
when the members of the second class of beneficiaries could cut off the
claim of the first class in less than the full two year period of limitations in
the wrongful death act. Missouri courts have uniformly held that when
there is no act of appropriation by the first class during their shorter one
year limitation period, their right is cut off at the end of one year by the
existence of a second class of beneficiaries entitled to sue.48 While this
should have had the full two years in which to sue. But it has never been applied in
cases where there are two classes of beneficiaries, and the first does not appropriate
the claim in the shorter period.
43. 536 S.W.2d at 145.
44. McNamara v. Slavens, 76 Mo. 329, 331 (1882).
45. Blessing v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 357 Mo. 1006, 171 S.W.2d 602 (1943);
Hamilton v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 248 Mo. 78, 154 S.W. 86, (1913).
46. Spencer v. Bradley, 351 S.W.2d 202 (Mo. 1961).
47. In King v. Smith Baking Co., 228 Mo. App. 721, 71 S.W.2d 115 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1934) the court did not really deal with the problem of whether or not the
Workmen's Compensation claim was an "appropriation" of the claim for wrongful
death, but based the decision on a ruling that the Workmen's Compensation claim
was not an "action" such as would toll the statute of limitations.
48. Forehand v. Hall, 355 S.W.2d 940 (Mo. 1962); Goldschmidt v. Pevely
Dairy Co., 341 Mo. 982, 111 S.W.2d 1 (1937); Barker v. Hannibal & St. J. Ry., 91
1977]
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"shorter limitation period principle" has been uniformly applied, one
might question whether it is logically consistent. It conflicts with the "lon-
ger limitation period principle" by shortening the period of limitations
solely for the reason that there is more than one class of beneficiaries. " 9 A
logical interpretation of this statute would have been to allow the wrongful
death claim to be maintained anytime within the two year period of limita-
tions by anyone entitled to do so, but should a spouse or minor child
survive, the parents would not be able to appropriate the claim unless the
spouse or child failed to appropriate within the one year preferential
period.50 The first class would then lose only its preferential right, not the
entire opportunity to bring a suit.
In his dissent in Stock Yards, Judge Bardgett suggested that the above
interpretation could be reached most easily by following the lead of the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Gaudette v. Webb5' and recognizing a
common law action for wrongful death. As a result, wrongful death stat-
utes would no longer be strictly construed. The limitations period in the
death act would become a limit upon the remedy, not the right to sue, and
defendants could plead only the two year limitations period as a bar to
plaintiff's remedy.5 2 The court decided in an earlier case not to recognize
that a common law action for wrongful death existed in Missouri prior to
enactment of the first wrongful death statute. 53 It should reconsider that
decision in view of the length of time since the case was decided, the
persuasive arguments in Gaudette,54 and the failure of the Missouri Legisla-
ture to take action. 55
In construing the wrongful death statute, courts should remember
that the purpose of the Act is to provide compensation for those who have
Mo. 86, 14 S.W. 280 (1886); Coover v. Moore, 31 Mo. 574 (1862); Wessels v. Gipfel,
522 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
49. See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra.
50. See Davis, Wrongful Death, 73WASH. U.L.Q. 327, 356 (1973).
51. 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972).
52. In Gaudette the court decided that the right to recover for wrongful death
was of common law origin, and therefore the statute itself did not create the right to
recover. It was held that statutes limiting the period for bringing a wrongful death
action should be construed in the same manner as general statutes of limitations,
and should be tolled by all the provisions which would toll the general statutes of
limitations. 362 Mass. at 71, 284 N.E.2d at 229.
53. Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609, 614 (Mo. 1965), appeal
dismissed, 385 U.S. 5 (1966).
54. 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972). See also Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970). The Supreme Court held that an action for
wrongful death existed under general maritime law, reversing the rule of maritime
law that absent a statute, there can be no recovery for wrongful death.
55. In 1971 the Missouri Bar Association approved a revised wrongful death
act. It eliminated the worst problems of the statute by abolishing the preferred
system of beneficiaries, and making all tolling provisions in the general statutes of
limitations applicable to wrongful death. The proposed act was introduced into the
Missouri Legislature in 1971, but failed to pass. For the text of the proposed
revision see Davis, Wrongful Death, 73 WASH. U.L.Q. 327, 369-78 (1973).
[Vol. 42
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been deprived of the benefit of a familial relationship. There is no policy
reason to treat the limitations period differently in wrongful death than in
other tort actions. For defendants, there are no greater problems in
preparing evidence for trial than in other accident cases. 56 For the plain-
tiffs, the fact that periods of limitations are treated differently from gener-
al statutes of limitations often creates confusion and misunderstanding. It
frequently leads to an otherwise qualified beneficiary forfeiting the right to
recover for the loss of the family wage earner. The court can alleviate such
harsh results by construing the wrongful death statute so as to carry out its
clear compensatory purpose.
Technically, the court's interpretation of the limitations period in Stock
Yards was correct. However, it was based on earlier decisions which strictly
construed the wrongful death statute as in derogation of the common law.
As the Stock Yards dissent pointed out, it is questionable whether the
wrongful death cause of action really is in derogation of the common law.57
If the wrongful death statute is to fulfill its liberal compensatory purpose,
this strict constructionist attitude must be eliminated. The courts would be
unrealistic to wait for the problem to be solved by the legislature; plaintiffs
deprived of wrongful death claims are unlikely to join together to lobby the
legislature for change in the wrongful death laws. Courts should not lightly
overrule many years of case precedent, but in this instance, the burden of
reform has clearly fallen on the courts. The court should consider the
words of the United States Supreme Court when they decided to overrule
prior case law stating that there was no general maritime wrongful death
cause of action other than that provided for by statute.5 8 The Court was
impressed by the "weighty considerations" underlying stare decisis, but
concluded that "a judicious reconsideration of precedent cannot be as
threatening to public faith in the judiciary as continued adherence to a rule
unjustified in reason. . . ."59 The decision in Stock Yards should be recon-
sidered at the earliest possible opportunity. Until that time, plaintiffs facing
a period of limitations problem under the wrongful death act must bring
their claims within the scope of the areas where liberal policies already have
been allowed.
MARY C. DOESBURG
56. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1296 (1956).
57. 536 S.W.2d at 150-56.
58. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 402 (1970).
59. Id. at 405.
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